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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CATHARINE S. GIBBONS,
Plaintiff and .A.ppellant
-YS-

BYRON

BRIMM~

. A_PPELLANT 'S

and ,vife

.lt, BRIMM,
Defendants and Respondents

HILD..._~

ST.A.TEJIE~TT

Case No. 7596

REPLY BRIEF

OF FACTS

Respondents in their brief devote considerable space
in a discussion of the relationship bet\veen plaintiff and
Hilda Brirmn.

That there 'vas a bond of affection

resembling that of mother and daughter.

Defendants

attempt to strengthen their case 'vith the contention that
Hilda had done so much for Catherine in past years.
But the evidence also sho,vs that Catharine practically
reared Hilda fro1n childhood, assisted her through
school, including college. (Tr. 473)

But this is ilnnla-

terial, bceause the defendants' defense depends entirely
upon whether they performd the contract to care for
and 1naintain the plaintiff as they agreed to on Januar~· 25, 1949.
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Counsel states that plaintiff had always promised

that upon her death Hilda should inherit what she had,
and that she actually n1ade out her will giving all her
}Jropert~'

to Hilda, and upon such promises being n1ade,

Hilda conveyed her 1/9th interest in the property to the
pla1ntiff. ']~his statement is untrue. Hilda conveyed
the 1/9th interest in the fall of 1947. And the will
\Ya~ rnade during the summer of 1948, and after the defendants began living \vith the plaintiff. And this \vill
\\'a~ made on condition that plaintiff could live with
the defendants and that they \Vould care for and support
her during the remainder of her life. It was this will,
as defendants pretended that plaintiff did not want to
probate because it 'vas too costly. In fact, the will
"~as n1erged into the deed and bill of sale, (Exs. "Q"
an(l "lT".)
Defendants contend that friction bet,veen plaintiff and defendant Brimm, developed as a result of the
John C. Anderson deal, but this is emphatically denied
by the plaintiff. (Tr. 88, 89) Hilda testified that
plaintiff was unable to acco1npany them to Logan, but
told Hilda that whatever terms she and Byron decided
on ,vould be agreeable to plaintiff. Is it conceivable
that after plaintiff, according to Hilda's testimony, had
advised defendants that she \vould be satisfied with the
terms ,vhich they agreed upon, that she would then
co1nplain about it~ What could plaintiff possibly gain
from that~ Plaintiff positively denied that she made
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any co1nplaint about the pr1et' paid for the ,John C.
~\nderson

interest in thP property.

It is further subn1itted that 1nost of the ~taten1ent~
Inade in defendant ·s brief through pages 1-7 relate to
a period of ti1ne prior to the 1nonth of ,July 1949.
Counsel also states that during this period the parties
lived happily together. It is adn1itted that during this
period the defendants "·ere friendly to the plaintiff,
and treated her kindly and \vere considerate of her
'velfare. It \vas covering this period of time when defendants' witnesses- Ethel Piper, Hazel Hoeft, and
Edward Hoeft-testified to. None of them paid a visit
to the apartment during fall and 'vinter of 1949-50.
(Tr. 332-353) According to the record, the witness,
Ruby Keeler, was the only witness who saw the plaintiff,
or visited the apartment from September 1, 1949, to
February 10, 1950. And plaintiff testified that Ruby
came occasionally to the apartment at lunch time, to
assist plaintiff in preparing lunch. But these visits
were not regular. Otherwise, plaintiff remained alone
in the apartment from 7:45 a.m. to 5 o'clock p.m., every
day but Saturday and Sunday.
Plaintiff testified that during July, 1949, the defendant, Byron Brimm, began to manifest towards plaintiff an arrogant and overbearing attitude, (Tr. 88),
and fro1n that time until February 10, 1950, he absolutely
failed to show any concern for plaintiff's welfare. In
fact, he absented himself entirely from the plaintiff.
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( r:r'r. 89)

And the evidence · shows that his conduct

also affected 1-Iilda adversely against plaintiff, because
during this period of time she 'vas cross and irritable
'vith plaintiff.
1'he foregoing conclusively shows that the plaintiff
\ra~ not a difficult person to live with, otherwise she
'vould likely have created trouble during the first year
that she lived with the defendants. The witness, I\1rs.
Thornton, testified that the plaintiff was not hard to
ltandle (Tr. 198), but on the contrary, she worked along
with ~irs. Thornton very nicely. ~Irs. Thornton also
testified (Tr. 187) that when plaintiff first came to her
home she was nervous and afraid to do anything for
fear !irs. Thornton 'vould criticize her. This indicates
that Hilda had been cross, critical and irritable with
plaintiff and had failed to be congenial, co-operative and
fTiendly with her.

ARGUMENT

Point I
The Court erred in making its Finding of Facts
No. 1-that plaintiff, ''was at all times capable and competent in all respects to transact business,'' and the
Court erred in making its finding No. 10, and its Conclusions and Decree.
Respondents concede that the question pertaining
to the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction of January 25, 1949, 'vhen the deed and bill of
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sale "~ere executed, ··"·a~ not 'vhether therP 'vas an
agree1nent het~v·een the partie~~ but \Yho the partiPs 'vere,
and "·hat 'vn~ the agree1nent.'" In this connection it i~
re~pectfully

snb1nitted that defendant~ have atteu1pted

by their pleading8 and 0Yidence to 1nake . 1nuch of the

fact that BYron Briunn neYer solicited or n1ade an\'"
.
~

pro1nise to plaintiff nor "·as any conYeyance 1nade to
hiln. It is rather significant that it 'vas Attorney Dicken~~ Byron ·s friend of four or fiv-e years standing, "·ho
prepared the deed and bill of sale. It 'vas also Byron
"·ho caine to l~ogan and called at the writer's office
to procure the description of the property contained in
the deed and. bill of sale of January 25, 1949. vVhen
he procured this description, he returned to Ogden and
inuuediately had I\Ir. Dickens, his close friend prepare
the deed and bi~l of sale. Plaintiff testified that they
had urged her to convey the property to Hilda on several
prior occasions, but she hesitated. (Tr. 150, 151) It
therefore appears that it \Vas Byron Brimm who engineered this transaction. Yet counsel contends that Byron
Brimm 'vas .... an uninterested party.
The activity of defendant Brimm in procuring the
execution of the deed and bill of sale is somewhat coluparable to that of J. H. Ward, in the Ward case, (85
P. 2d. 635) as sho,vn by the following language set forth
in the opinion (page 637) viz.,-'' Appe~lant's claim to
an interest in the property in question arises, if at all,
out of the tern1s of the 'vill n1ade at his request, if not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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actual dictation.''
Defendant~ admit in their pleadings, evidence and

In respondent's brief, (page 10), that -''Hilda never
<lenied there \vas an agreement.

She and other's re-

pPate<lly testified that there always was an agreement

or understanding as to 'vhy the several contracts and
transfers were made.'' It thus appears that the allegations in pararaph five of plaintiff's amended complaint
a rP conceded.
Defendants also concede that they paid no money
consideration for this property. (Tr. 112) The sole
consideration 'vas their agreement to live with, support,
and care for the plaintiff for the remainder of her natural life, and pay for her burial. ( Tr. 112) This is
co needed in respondent's brief, and Counsel concedes
that the "crux of the trial went rather to the broad
question of performance.''
Counsel's comment (page 12 repsondent's brief)
on the second paragraph of appellent's brief ( pages
19-20 ) is clearly erroneous. There is a clear attempt
on his part to inject a foreign matter into the subject
viz.-the comparison between the facts in this and the
ard case. ( 85 P. 2d. 635). Of course, Counsel would
like to divert from the point discussed on pages 19-20
of appellant's brief because there is a strong resenlblance in the facts and circumstances between this, and
the Ward case.

'7
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In thi~ connection it ~hould be rP1nen1bered that the

~ trial court ruled in

t1

faY or

of ~r rs.

' rard,

\\~hich

\VHH

proper under the eYideneP in that case. And this Court
affirn1ed the trial

court,~

j u d g 111 en t.

It Is re-

spectfully subn1itted that by the great \veight of the

_ eYidence, if not the undisputed evidence, in the case at
bar, the trial court should have follo\ved the decision
rendered in the ,,. . ard case .
. A. nd it is also respectfully subn1itted that J-udge
\\. . olfe ·s conclusion as set out on page 13 of respondent's
~ brief \\~as correct as it applied to the evidence and hold_ ing of the trial court in the Ward case.
Respondent's counsel on pages 13 and 1±, of his brief
· contends that the facts in \Vard case and the instant
case are not similar. For similarity of the agreements
in the hvo cases and, the reliance upon the agreen1ents
by Mrs. Ward, and, by the plaintiff in the case at bar,
see quotations from the Ward case on pages 19 and 20
of appellant's brief. See also plaintiff's testimony
on pages 16 and 17 of appellant's brief. After making
· these comparisons, it will be seen that the facts and
circumstances in the two cases are very similar.

Point 2
The Court erred in making its Finding of Facts
,. numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 12, and 14, and its Conclusions
~ of Law and Decree and all parts thereof, and the Court
erred by its failure and refusal to niake and enter its

~I
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findings of fact, Con?lusions of law and Decree, holding
that defendants had co1nmitted a breach of the contract
an<l rescinding the sa1ne; also its failure and refusal to
<·aneel the deed and bill of sale.
On page 19 of respondent's brief, Counsel contends
that plaintiff's testimony appearing on pages 24-27 of
appellant's brief 'vas adduced in response to suggestive
que~tions. A close examination of this testimony will
reveal that such is not the case.
It is also claimed that the reason 'vhy defendant
Brinnn did not associate 'vith plaintiff from July, 1949,
to February 10, 1950, was that plaintiff disliked hint.
TI1e reason for her dislike, if any, no doubt sten1s from
ltis cruel treatment of her, beginning in July 1949, and
eontinuously thereafter until February 10, 1950, 'vhen as
a result of defendants cruelty and neglect, plaintiff was
obliged to leave their apartment. Her testilnony, son1e of
'vhich appears on pages 24-27 of appellant's brief reveals
that after the defendants had succeeded in relieving the
plaintiff of the title and transfer of all her property,
defendant Byron Brimm exhibited an entirely different
attitude towards plaintiff than he did from June 8, 1948
to July 1949. Doesn't this fit the pattern recognized
by the courts in cases of this type~ See cases referred
to on pages 30-34 of appellant's brief.
It is respectfully submitted that defendant Brimm
had a definite object in mind after defendants began to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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liYt:' "~ith plaintiff.

9
Plaintiff testified thnt tltey sug-

gested ~eyeral ti1ne~\ in fnet. sht>

\\yas

urged by· theut

to convey and transfer her property to Hilda. And
during this period of tilue Brinn11 \vas Yery eongenial
\Yith ,and ~idernte of plaintiff. ~-\.nd, as Counsel :::~tates
in respondent ·s brief\ they lived together as one happ~r
fanlily. But after plaintiff had been relieved of all her
property, then defendant Brin1111 began to exhibit an unfriendly attitude and failed to c.are for or associate
w·ith plaintiff ,,~hich later caused defendant Hilda Brimm
to also neglect the plaintiff.
The reaction that frequently occurs 1n cases of
this type, and it occured in the instant case, is recognized
by the eases-, referred to on pages 30-34 of appellant's
brief, including -\y· ard vs. \Vard 85 P. (2d) 635.
On page 20 of respondent's brief, Counsel attempts
to distinguish the cases cited on page 28 of appellant's
brief, but when those cases are examined it will be
seen that they support the appellant in the instant case.
It is respectfully submitted that the cases cited in appellant's brief and referred to on pages 20 and 21 of
respondent's brief, are directly in point with this case,
even though respondent~s counsel attempts to contend
otherwise. The fact that Counsel passes from one case
to the next 'vith the statement that each case is distinguishable from the case at bar, doesn't prove that they
are. Appellant will welcome a close examination of
each of the cases cited on pages 35-39, of appellant's
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brief, in which cases it will be seen that the facts closely
re~ernble the facts in the case at bar, and they hold that

under such facts, the contract was breached by the
grantee.
()n page 24 of respondent's brief, Counsel attempts
to minimize the decision in the case of Gardner vs. Ferderiek (Wash) 165 Pac. 85. by saying that,-''This case
~in1ply stands for the rule that the court reviewed the
evidence of the Trial Court and upheld its decision,"infering that the Trial Court held in favor of the grantee. The facts in that case are practically identical
w·ith the facts in the instant case, and the Trial Court
canceled the deed. The Supreme Court affirmed the
juchnent. See pages 37-38 of appellant's brief for review
of that case. Likewise appellant challenges respondent's
statement with respect to Dodge vs. Dodge (~Iich.) annotated in 112 A. L. R. 697. See quotation from this
_ case on page 39 of appellant's brief.
On page 27 of respondent's brief a quotation appears from 9 A. J. Sec. 31, Cancellation of Instruments.
The rule therein stated does not apply to the factual
situation presented in the instant case. The notes cited
therein, 49 L. R. A. (NS) 1015, 25 L.R.A. (NS) 932
and 43 L.R.A. (NS) 943, have been examined and these
notes are predicated upon the proposition that the grantees are without fault and that they have performed the
con tract in full measure. Of course there are cases
holding where the grantees have supported the grantor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for a long period of tilne and thP propert~· i~ of uloderate value. a rescission of the contract has been denied.
But of course. this principle does not apply to thP facts

in the case at bar.
The annotation 111 l.J.R.~\. 1917 D. 627. cited in
respondent ~s brief. page :.?8. supports the plaintiff's
case. The annotator :state~ that the general rule supported by the ,,~eight of authority is as follo,vs:
"'The rule stated in the note appended to
Dixon vs. :Jlilling Co. 43 L.R.A. 916, that, by the
\veight of authority, "~here an agreement to support is the consideration for a conveyance of
property it Jnust be perfornzed by the grantee,
or the grantor nzay have the contract rescinded,
recei,ces the support of the 1najority of the cases
passing upon the question since this note. Thus
it is held that equity will set aside a deed for
breach by the grantee of his agreement to support the grantor where this ~greement formed
the consideration for the deed. 0 'Ferrall _vs.
O'Ferrall (1916) 276 Ill. 132 114 N. E. 561; Berry
vs. Heiser (1915) 271 Ill. 264, 11 N. E. 99; Sanchez vs. Sanchez (1916) N. M. 159 Pac. 669;
Anderson vs. Reed (1915) 20 N.W. 202 L.R.A.
1916 B, 862, 148 Pac. 502; Houston vs. Greiner
(1914) 73 Ore. 304, 144 Pac. 133; Tysor vs. Adams
(1914) 116 Va. 239, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1197, 81
S. E. 76; Young vs. Young (1914} 157 Wis. 424
147, N. W. 361. So, where the real consideration
for a deed was an agreement by the grantee to
support the grantor and the former not only
breaches the agreement but denies it, equity will
rescind the conveyance. Martin vs. Hall (1913)
115 V. 358, 79 S. E. 320. Although no actual
fraud is imputed to the grantee, ~evertheless,
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equity will not sustain a conveyance the consideration of which was an agreement to support the
grantor, where the grantee failed to perform.
Jenkins vs .•Jenkins (1913) 66 Ore. 12, Pac. 542. ''
(Italics supplied)
rrll<~
:3~5,

caHe of Wilson vs. Wilson

(~Iich.)

125 N. W.

is also eited in respondent's brief page 28. In this

case the plaintiff, an elderly woman deeded some land
(v-alue not given) to her grandson Fred Wilson. The
deed was dra,vn hy plaintiff's attorney and a life estate
rt> :--:e rYe d. The action to set aside the deed was brought
principally, if not entirely, upon the theory of fraud and
rnistake in the execution of the deed as plaintiff testified she understood that the instrun1ent she signed wa~
1nerely a lease. In the \\Tilson case fraud and 1nistake
"Tas the principal charge 1nade.
The case of ''Tillian1 vs. Lang,vill, 25 L.R.A. (NS)
932, is cited, and Counsel says the court refused to grant
cancellation to grantor. However, for an understanding
of the reason for the judgn1ent rendered in that case
it appears that John J. Evans, a 'vidower, voluntarily
conve:Ted his farn1 to "\Villiam M. Lang,vill, a grandson, 20 years age. This grandson was the child of
l\1ary J. Langwill, the only child of John J. Evans.
Evans died and his personal representative filed suit to
cancel the deed. The court refused to set aside the deed
on the theory that the property was conveyed as an
outright gift.
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Counsel quotes fron1 the ea~e of t~ornPll v~. \Vhitney 93, N. ,,~. 61.4, (~lirh.) thnt,-

-'Where the breach is not entire, and tlH~
grantees "yere required to pay a stated ~tun :for
the support and Inaintenanee of the grantor so
lono· as he continues to live a'vav
. fro1n the1n,
and provide hin1 n hon1e 'vith the1n should he at
any time desire to return. ' '
~

The foregoing rule 'vas no doubt properly applied
in that case, but the facts therein are at eon1plete variance \Yith the facts in the intant case. In that case
the plaintiff 'vas SO years of age. He conveyed his
property to the grantees, Septen1ber 5, 1899, and lived
w·ith then1 in the grantor's ho1ne until ~fay, 1901. The
undisputed evidence sho,ved that grantee perfor1necl
every obligation under the contract. The incident that
brought about the difficulty bet,veen the parties \vas instigated by the grantor. It \Vas of a personal nature involving one of the grantee's daughters 'vho had eloped.
The plaintiff made so1ne nnproper remarks to a couple
of visiting relatives, 'vhich were overheard by the defendant's wife, and she retarted by saying some bad
things about the plaintiff's daughter. The next morning
the plaintiff left the defentants home and took up his
abode with one of his children.
Thus the undisputed evidence showed that the plaintiff had no complaint about the treatment he received
at the defendants' ho1ne until he and the defendant's
\Vife had the foregoing quarrel. He did not rescind or
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atte1npt to rescind the contract, or request a reconveyHIH•,e

hefore he left defendant's home.
ri h<-' eaHf~ of \Voolcott vs. \Voolcott (~{ich.) is cited
1

on page 29 of respondent's brief.
<'OUrt ~aid:

In that case the

'' v\There the breach is not of a serious char-

aeter the grantee W'ill he required to pay a definite
arnount for the support of the grantor so long as he
resides else,vhere than \Yith· them.'' \Vhen the facts
jn that case are con1pared with the facts in the instant
ease, it could, \vith propriety, be said that there was no
breach at all in the \\1oolcott case.
<._;ounsel for respondent refers to the cases of
Sprangler vs. Y araborough ( Okla) 101 Pac. 1107; Mc(~lelland YS. ~fcClelland (Ill.) 51 N. E. and Coy-\vendal
vs. Kellogg (N.D.) 198 N. W. 472, cited from on page
31-32 of appellant's brief. These cases support the proposition that after the conveyance the grantee and husband, or wife, as the case may be, usually exhibits a
vastly different attitude towards the grantor, as was so
1narked in the instant case.
The case of Simmons vs. Shafer (Kan.) 160 Pac.
199. is cited on page 29 of respondent's brief as authority for the Trial Court's decision. It will be seen, however,that there is a vast difference between the facts in
that case and the case at bar. The facts in that case
disclose that the plaintiff, 70 years of age, conveyed to
a grandson, the defendants intestate, 1/2 interest in
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certain land subject to a InortgagP thereon in the suu1
of $600.00. The c.onsideration for the deed 'vas the payInent of the n1ortgage by the grantee and also to care for
and support the plaintiff during the re1nainder of hi~
natural life. The plaintiff lived 'Yith the grantee and
hi~ family for a period of about five. years until the

grantee ~s death. It is adn1itted that the plaintiff found
no fault ,vith the treatn1ent he received from the grantee
during the latters lifetilne as appears fron1 the language
in the opinion of tpe Kansas Supre1ne C~ourt:
''It appears that these conditions were faithfully carried out for a period of about five years
and as long as the grantee lived. During this
period improve1nents 'vere n1ade upon the land,
and the incmnbrance 'vas enlarged by the grantee
and his brother, to 'vhom the other half of the
land had been conveyed. There was no failure
to observe its terms by either party to the contract, nor were there any grounds for canceling the deed during the life time of the grantee.''
Respondents' counsel cites the case of Patton vs.
Nixon, Oregon 52 Pac. 1048, (page 20 of respondents'
brief) to support the Trial Court's judgment permitting
Hilda to retain title to the property, on the condition
that she pay to plaintiff a monthly stipent, which the
court fixed atb$75.00, per month. It is submitted that
the particular facts in the Patton case support the
rule, but the facts in that case are vastly different from
the facts in the case at bar, so the rule there applied
should have no application in the instant case. The
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contended that the property \vas conveyed to her as a
gift hy her aged moth e r, and as stated by the
Sup r e 111 e Court,--'' and in consideration of the
fact that brothers and sisters of this defendant had received large an1ounts of property from their father's
estate, \Vhile this defendant had received nothing but
t'vo acres of land, and in further consideration of the
fact that this defendant had repeatedly told plaintiff
that she \Vould furnish a home for her."
The aged
1nother lived harmoniously \Vith the defendant for about
~!,ixteen n1on ths and \vas then taken from her hon1e
during defendant's absence and without her knowledge,
and ren1oved to the home of plaintiff's son-in-law where
she ren1a]ned at time of trial. It is very likely that the
suit \Vas instituted at the instance of the plaintiff's
other children and in-laws.
It is significant that in a later Oregon case, Houston vs. Greiner, 144 Pac. 133, -vvhere the facts are sinlilar to t~ose in the instant case, and cancellation of the
deed \Vas decreed, the case of Patton vs. Nixon supra.
\vas not cited.
Counsel also contends that the vVard case is not an
authority for the case at bar, because it didn't cite the
case of Chadd v. Moser, 71 Pac. 870, an earlier Utah
case.. It is ·submitted that the facts in that case are
clearly distinguishable fro1n the facts in the Ward case,
as well as the facts in the case at bar. The fact that the
Chadd case was not cited or considered in the Ward
I
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evident of the fact that it \Vas not deemed

in point on the facts \Yith the Ward case.
Point 3

The court erred in 1naking its Finding of Facts,

No. 11. and its Conclusions of

LR\Y

and Decree, by

which the court has 1nodified and refor1ned the contract
of January ~1949, entered into bet"~een the parties.
Respondent's counsel denies that the court 1nade a
ne"~

and d i f f e r e n t contract to the one alleged in
paragraph five of her a1nended cornplaint. It is said
that plaintiff doe~ not contend that Hilda should discontinue teaching and devote all of her time to the care
of plaintiff. Although plaintiff did suggest that Hilda
quit school, yet she "\vould have been satisfied had defendants continued their treatment of her as prevailed
fron1 June, 1948, to July 1949.

There is a vast difference between the terms of
the contract, alleged in paragraph five of the con1plaint,
and the provisions of finding No. 11, the conclusions of
la\v, and the decree, which provides,-"that the defend;
ant Hilda . .~.
. Brimm is the absolute owner of the property in question.'' As provided ·by the forgoing conclusion and decree, the defendant, Hilda A. Brimm, is vested with absolute title and ownership in said property.
The court made this provision even though plaintiff is
yet alive and the contract of .January 25, 1949, has not
been co1nplied \Vi th.
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Court approved of a finding n1ade by tlw

trial court in the \V ard case, 85 P. 2d 635, 'vhich reads,' '1.,he court further finds that the said will, if treated
a~

a contract, does not give the defendant a present

interest in the property h:' reason of his 1nanage1nent
and control thereof during the lifetin1e of his 1nother
but that there is a condition precedent to his acquiring an interest in the propert~~.''
r-Phe courts unanin1ously hold in cases of this type,

that the grantee holds the title as a trustee; and the
duty to perforn1 the contract is a personal and continuing one. Absolute title does not vest in the grantee,
until the death of the grantor: Payette vs. Ferrier
(Wash.) 55 Pac. 629.
Said finding No. 11, the conclusion and decree
further provides that defendants have consented and
agreed that plaintiff n1ay live alone in her. home at
l\Iendon, and defendants 'vill pay for her keep, includ·ing the reasonable cost of a lady to assist plaintiff in
the event of her illness. Thus under the last 1nentioned
provision of the Court's decree) defendants have been
relieved of all personal care.
rrhe cases hold that the consideration for a deed
of this character becomes a personal and continuing
duty; and the courts further emphasize that colnpanionship, kindly and affectionate treatment form the principal elements in the consideration for a contract of
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this type: and strict perforn1ance rests upon the grantee
to disehargt> thi~ contract personally, and cannot be
annulled, shifted or transferred to another. See cases
listed on pages -!6--tS of appellant ~s brief. But unde1·
the conclusions and decree, the defendants are no"·
1nerely obligated to pay $75.00 per 1nonth for plahltiff 's support, \\-rhich does not exceed the rental value
of the property. Thus, the court has transferred to
Hilda, a valuable property, without paying_ therefor, or
rendering any services 'vhatsoever to the plaintiff, in
con1plete contravention of the terms of the adn1itted contract entered into bet,veen the parties on January 25,
1949.
Counsel states (page 32) that it is apparent fron1
the record that the court took great pains in arriving
at it decision. This is rather doubtful, in viev.r of the
fact that the court permitted the defendants to dictate
the decision by the filing of their so-called election.
But regardless of 'vhether the court took great pains,
it is earnestly contended that the decision is inequitable~ unjust, illegal, and erroneous from every conceivable standpoint.

Point 4
The Court erred in making its Finding of Fact
numbers 6, 7, 11, 13, and making and entering its Conclusions of law and Decree; in permitting the amended
answer to be filed to include consideration of Idaho
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tiff's objection in relation thereto; (Tr. 245) denying
plaintiff's n1otion of August 3, 1950; (Tr. 52) and denyIng· plaintiff's n1otion of ~'\ ugust
Coun~el

24, 1950.

for respondents entirely ignores the fact

that the purported assign1nents fnnn plaintiff to Hilda
of the Idaho 1nortgage, (Def's Ex. 3) was filed of reeord
in Pow'er County, Idaho, on

~larch

3, 1949, and re-

corded in Book 83 of Assignn1ents at page 68. As the
record stands \vith respect to that Inortgage, the de
fendant, Hilda Bri1nn1, is the o\vner of the san1e by
virtue of said assign1nent. Plaintiff has filed an action in I:>o,ver County, Idaho, to cancel the aforesaid
assign1nent, and has acquired jurisdiction of the defettdants by service of su1nn1ons on June 12, 1950. This
Is conceded by respondents.
Counsel for respondent further contends (page :34
of brief) that,-'' a note and mortgage and the assignInent thereof is person~l property, and the dispute over
the o\vnership thereof is an action in personam." If
the said assignn1ent ( Def 's Ex. 3) had not been filed of
record, Counsel's contention 1night be sound. But, as
the as~ign1nent has been filed of record with the County
Recorder of Po,ver County, Idaho, affecting the title
to Idaho property, it then becomes an ,action in rein.
A Utah court would have no right to 1nake an order
affecting title to real property situated in the State of
Idaho. Jensen vs. Jensen, (Wash.) 147 P. 2d. 512.
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The cases and the lTtah
cited on page 34 of

Rule~

respondent,~

of civil proePdnrP

brief are not in point.

Thev deal w·ith the ~nbject of splitting eauses of action
involved in one transaction.

But this

i~

not a

ea~~~

'vhere there is an atte1npt to split a single contract into
~eYeral causes of~ action.
The transaction involvingplaintiff's signing the purported assignn1ent is one
transaction in and of itself. It has no relationship to
and, is not a part of, any other transaction included
in plaintiff's a1nended con1plaint or ainendinents therPto. The cases and authorities cited and referred to on
pages 35 and 36 of respondent's brief relate to actions
111 personam. None of them affect title to real estate.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion of respondent's brief, counsel states
that respondents have sustained a loss in con1ing to
to Mendon to care for the p l a i n t i f f. It is
respectfully submitted that counsel's contention is
r e f u t e d by the r e c o r d. At the time defend~
ants ca1ne to Mendon in J nne 1948, Hilda had just concluded teaching school for the school year of 1947~1948,
and defendant Brimm admitted that at that time he
didn't have a job and hadn't worked for about nine
tnonths prior thereto, because he 'vas suffering fron1
arthritis. (Tr. 456) Therefore, he 'vas afforded an
opportunity to manage the farm and hire the labor,
'vhich he did for the 1nost part during the year 1948.
rrhe record shows that Hilda is still teaching school and
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~

during the current school year.
during the two school years-1948-1949 and 1949-1950she earned $6150.00, (rrr. 357) and she is no"\v teaching~
And the record shows that defendants \Vhen coining
to Mendon in 1948 didn't intend to live there permanently as Hilda expected to teach school. In fact, Hilda has
lived there only during the sum1ners of 1948-1949, \vhile
she \Vas taking care of the plaintiff. It therefore def..
initely appears that Hilda's inco1ne or e1nployment has
not been in any wise affected, and Byron, not having a
job \vhen the defendants came to Mendon, \Vas given
light work, and it was an opportunity for him, because in all probability he 'vould not have been in a
condition to work for a considerable period of time.
And 1noreover, defendants did not have a car at
that time so con1ing to plaintiff's home gave them inlInediate access to her car which they used continuously
until about l\{arch 1, 1950. ( Tr. 357) The defendants have
also enjoyed the use of defendant's checking account,
from which there was withdrawn by checks between June
8, 1948 and September 10, 1949, the su1n of $3,137.74,
"\vhich money was used for household, hospital, medical,
and miscellaneous expenses. And during the same
period of time, there "\vas withdrawn from plaintiff's
savings account $3,008.50 of which $2,000 was paid to
John C. Anderson for his 1/9 interest in the real property, and the balance of $1,008.50 was spent for household, hospital, and miscellaneous expenses.
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The defendant~ also ~harerl 'vith plaintiff the in~
corne frorn the crop of 1948 "rhich a1nounted to $1,660.34
and 'vhich \vas deposited to plaintiff's ehecking account
and becarne a part of the total sunt of $3,137.74 above
1nentioned. ...-\nd the defendants haYe had the exclusive
incorne fron1 the farrn crops for the t"~o years of 1949 and
1950, no part of \vhicl1 \Yas received or enjoyed b:- the

plaintiff.
This gives the court a surnn1ary of ho"r

defendant~

haYe been affected during the period of tirne in question.
It is respectfully subn1itted that the \vriter has not found
a case, and it is doubtful that a case can be found which
1natehes the expenditures n1ade hy a grantor during the
short period of ti1ne the parties lived together in this
case. It "\vill also be remembered that "\vhen
the plaintiff \vas obliged to leave the defenants' apartment on February 10, 1950, she had only thirty cents.
It is respectfully submitted that from the foregoing, it
\vill appear that defendants have not sustained any financial losses.
The appellant respectfully submits to this Honorable Court that the findings, conclusions, and judgInent of the trial court be reversed, remanding the case
and directing that the trial court enter findings, conclusions and decree, canceling the deed and bill of sale ;
and to enter such judgrnent with respect to the other
rauses of action as equity and justice bet,veen the parties
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'vill dictate, and to elilninate the issues involved in the
Idaho case, and that plaintiff be a\varded costs on this
appeal.
Respectfully submitted
I.J. E. NELSON
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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